![]() The primary reason for keeping a significant number of submarines at sea is to avoid a surprise Russian “bolt from the blue” attack that could destroy submarines in port, along with bombers at their air bases and ICBMS in silos. (The new submarine’s planned reactor will not require refueling, a time-consuming process, so 12 new submarines can do the work of 14 Ohios.) This suggests, however, that the Navy plans to maintain roughly the same deterrent patrol tempo for the next 50 years as it has for the past 15, i.e., to keep five to seven submarines at sea at any one time. Navy wants to replace its 14 Ohio-class submarines with 12 new submarines. The Pentagon plans to keep over 60 percent of its allowed deployed strategic warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). There is no question that there will be a replacement submarine, as the sea-based leg of the triad has long been considered the most survivable. The Ohio-class submarines will begin to retire at the end of the 2020s. If tight budgets require that the United States reduce its strategic forces, what options might it consider?įirst, take ballistic missile submarines. A one-third cut would bring that number down to about 500. The Joint Chiefs of Staff validated that level, so it presumably in their view suffices to meet the requirements of deterrence and war plans.Īdministration officials have said privately that the United States would be prepared to make commensurate reductions in the New START limits of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers). Last summer, President Obama proposed to reduce the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads by one-third, i.e., to about 1,000. The Defense Department will almost certainly find that it must cut something. While some operations and support costs might be saved in the near term, the real potential savings come in the out years, when steps must be taken to recapitalize each of the three legs of the strategic triad: ballistic missile submarines, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and heavy bombers. Given fiscal realities, it would be prudent to anticipate that the nuclear part of the budget will come under pressure in future years. military has other needs, and buying new strategic submarines, missiles and bombers has an opportunity cost: the new conventional arms-such as the F-35 and Virginia-class attack submarine-that the military is far more likely to use than nuclear weapons. Strategic forces thus account for just about 6.5 percent of the total budget.īut only in Washington would one consider $35 billion not a lot of money. Excluding the overseas contingency account (Afghanistan), the Department of Defense budget for FY 2014 is $520 billion. ![]() In one sense, that is not a lot of money. ![]() These two reports suggest an average cost of $33-35 billion per year for U.S. A January study by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at Monterey put the cost of the strategic triad over the next 30 years at a cool trillion dollars. nuclear forces over the next ten years at $355 billion. A Congressional Budget Office report issued in December projected the cost of U.S. Washington thus should consider how, in an era of limited defense dollars, it might adjust its strategic force structure. strategic nuclear forces will be expensive, at a time when fiscal realities will undoubtedly continue to constrain the defense budget. Two recent studies make clear that maintaining and recapitalizing U.S.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |